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20 July 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Critique for OXCART Mission Number BX6708

1. Subject mission critique was conducted in the OSA Control Center commencing at 1500 hours, 18 July 1967. Appropriate OSA, OSI and OEL personnel participated.

2. Mission Data:

- a. Date Flown: 13 July 1967
- b. Pilot: [REDACTED]
- c. Aircraft: 127
- d. Equipment: Type I, [REDACTED]
- e. Area of Operation: North Vietnam
- f. Flight Time: 3+40
- g. Mission: Successful

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
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3. Operations: No significant operational problems were experienced.

a. Route: The INS plot indicates only minor deviations from planned route and well within planning parameters.

b. Mission generation: A modified canned mission number 19 was transmitted to the Detachment prior to H-24. Subsequently, deteriorating weather dictated a revision of the route at H-8. A new computer flight plan and associated instructions were transmitted to the Detachment at approximately H-6. Post-mission remarks by the Detachment Commander stress that these late

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changes compressed the mission coordination and planning cycle at the Detachment to an undesirable time span. He strongly recommended that Reports Control Manual timing be used if Headquarters desires to "customize" missions instead of using pre-planned "canned" routes. The RCM timing requires the transmission of the mission flight plan to arrive at the Detachment at NLT H-15. General Bacalis requested Operations to establish the capability for "customized" mission planning consistent with taking advantage of the latest possible weather forecasts.

- c. Tanker support was satisfactory.
- d. Operational support was satisfactory.
- e. Automation support was satisfactory.
- f. Reports Control Manual reports and timing were satisfactory.

4. Weather: The forecast target weather was Category II. Actual weather was slightly better than forecast. Weather scout reports were timely and satisfactory.

5. Intelligence:

- a. Actual target coverage versus planned:

- (1) 12 of the 14 programmed COMOR targets were covered.
 2 other COMOR targets covered that were not programmed.
 14 total COMOR targets covered.
 2 bonus targets
 16 Total

- (2) Nine of the 23 targets in the JCS list that are being followed as first priority in CIA's bomb damage assessment study also were covered.

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b. Quality of take: Good. Resolution at nadir approached 1 foot. No changes indicated in exposure settings or filters used.

c. Hostile reactions: Negative.

d. Significant findings:

(1) No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was noted.

(2) A total of 71 SA-2 sites were identified, including one new site. Five of the sites were occupied. Fifty-four sites were unoccupied--including the one new site. The status of ten sites could not be determined. Two sites were shown to have been returned to agricultural use and have been dropped from the order of battle.

(3) Four of the major airfields of North Vietnam (Phuc Yen, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Hoa Lac, and Hanoi/Bac Mai) were covered by the mission. Coverage of Phuc Yen airfield, the main MIG base in North Vietnam, was limited by obliquity and scattered clouds, preventing a complete aircraft count, but clear photography of the other three airfields was obtained.

e. Camera take movement: Fast movement of take to the processing facility at Rochester was provided by C-141 aircraft. This was a MATS channel traffic aircraft returning to the CONUS. Diversion to Rochester was requested by AFRDR-P. Cost of this diversion is minimal, estimated to be less than \$4,000.00.

f. ELINT take movement: The [REDACTED] take was airlifted to [REDACTED] for duplication, then airlifted to Tokyo IAW existing procedures. At the request of the OSI/OEL participants, for future missions, the movement of the [REDACTED] original negative and dupe to Headquarters from Tokyo will be expedited on a priority basis in lieu of present routine handling. In the event that [REDACTED] take is acquired on "back-to-back" missions, both mission takes will be couriered from Tokyo at the same time.

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g. EWS Activations: None.

6. Materiel:

a. Aircraft general: Hydro quantity indicator malfunction; system operated normally.

b. Aircraft systems: Satisfactory.

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7. Communications: Communications support was satisfactory.

[REDACTED] reception was excellent; only normal [REDACTED] were received.

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8. Significant actions taken: Procedures to expedite the movement of System VI take to Headquarters have been established. (Action taken by D/O/OSA.)

9. Outstanding actions required: Establish a mission planning capability which is responsive to latest possible weather forecasts. (Actionee: D/O/OSA)

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for WILLIAM E. SHELTON

Colonel, USAF

Deputy for Operations, OSA

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OXC/O/OSA/ [REDACTED]

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